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Abstract 
Current account (CA) dispersion within European Union (EU) member states has been 
increasing progressively since the 1990s. Interestingly, the persistent deficits in many 
peripheral countries have not been accompanied by a significant growth process able to 
stimulate a long run rebalancing as neoclassical theory predicts. To shed light on the issue 
this paper investigates the determinants of Eurozone CA imbalances, focusing on the role 
played by financial integration. The analysis considers two samples of 22 OECD and 15 EU 
countries, three time horizons corresponding to various steps in European integration, 
different control variables and several panel econometric methods. The results suggest that 
within the OECD and EU groups, financial integration contributed to explain CA 
deterioration in the peripheral countries especially in the post-EMU period. The business 
cycle seems to have played a growing role over time, whereas the role of competiveness 
seems to have diminished with respect to the past. 
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Current account “Core-periphery dualism”  in 
the EMU 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
While the current account (CA) of the Eurozone as a whole has remained 
almost   balanced   since   the   1990s,   dispersion   across  member   states’   CAs   has  
been increasing. Diverging trends among countries have become particularly 
evident in the post-EMU period and have been characterized by persistent 
CA deficits in the Eurozone periphery that have been complemented by 
growing surpluses in some core countries. Such heterogeneous behaviour has 
been   called   “Eurozone   CA   core-periphery   dualism”   and   represents   a  
shortcoming for both the long-run sustainability of peripheral EU member 
states’   finances   and   the   effectiveness   of   centralized   intervention   within   the  
Euro Area. 
 
The lack of a spontaneous rebalancing process1 among Euro Area economies 
has stimulated a wide debate within the European institutions on the absence 
of proper rules and parameters such as ceilings for single countries CA 
imbalances into the existing EU treaties. The need to implement a stricter 
degree of policy coordination between the Eurozone members to prevent such 
imbalances expanding in the future has also been emphasized, and the                                                         1 In the post crisis period (2009-12), there was a substantial adjustment in the external imbalances of the Euro Area peripheral countries. However, this rebalancing was mainly due to the decline in domestic demand and the contraction in private investment, particularly in construction, as result of the economic crisis and thus cannot be associated with a good rebalancing process.  
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adoption of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) within the EMU 
countries at the end of 2011 goes exactly in this direction.  
 
According to the neo-classical theory of intertemporal utility maximization, 
diverging CA among countries is the natural consequence of a future 
convergence of economies with different levels of capital endowment. 
Specifically, countries with lower income per capita and higher productivity 
growth would be expected to attract foreign investment in view of the higher 
expected rates of return on capital. The productivity of the invested capital 
would eventually produce CA rebalancing through competitiveness gains in 
tradable sectors and reimbursement of the external debt.  
 
Nevertheless, from the beginning of the EMU to the present there has been no 
clear evidence of a spontaneous CA rebalancing process within the EMU, 
despite a strong adjustment in the external imbalances of the Eurozone 
peripheral countries during the financial crisis.  
 
In the literature various explanations have been proposed for the persistence 
of CA deficits among EU periphery members, including, for example, a lack 
of competitiveness due to high unit labour costs or unproductive investment 
in non-tradable sectors (i.e. housing investment). Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2002) offered another interesting explanation immediately after the creation 
of the EMU. By analysing the causes of Eurozone imbalances the authors 
showed that national saving and investment correlations in the periphery 
decreased significantly, especially as European financial integration 
intensified  (i.e. with the creation of the single currency). They considered this 
evidence to be an indication of the EMU suitability to create a well-integrated 
capital  market  (i.e.  “home  bias  reduction”).  They  also  found  that  the  Feldstein  
and Horioka, 1980 puzzle (i.e. the absence of capital outflows from higher 
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income per capita countries to poorer countries with higher expected returns) 
did not hold in the Eurozone, interpreting this fact as an increase of financial 
integration and a natural cause of CA divergences among EMU countries2 
that reflected opportunities for catching up and future convergence in the 
periphery.3 Ten years later the stylized facts have shown that the persistent 
deficits in many peripheral countries have not been accompanied by a 
significant growth process able to stimulate a long run rebalancing as 
neoclassical theory predicts. 
 
In the paper we explore the causes of the persistent CA divergences among 
Eurozone   countries   (i.   e.   CA   “core-periphery   dualism”)   during   the   EMU  
focusing on the role of the European financial integration process. To this end 
we examine the impact of capital flows liberalization (in addition to the main 
CA determinants) within the Eurozone using different time samples, groups 
of countries and econometric techniques and control variables. Robustness 
checks are also performed by taking into account the role of financial 
integration using two different indicators: the Chinn and Ito (2008) index of 
capital openness (known as the de iure measure) and a financial diffusion 
indicator that considers the ratio of financial assets plus liabilities to GDP for 
each country compared with the rest of the world (a de facto measure); both 
are available for a broad set of countries. Although these two capital openness 
indices are very different (they capture different aspects of financial 
development), they allow complementary sources of information on the 
phenomenon of financial integration to be explored. Since Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2002) a large literature has investigated the determinants of CA 
balances for different sets of countries using various regressors (income per                                                         2 This	  enables	  easier	  access	  to	  international	  capital	  markets	  of	  some	  “peripheral”	  countries	  and	  would therefore have helped to generate domestic demand pressures that finally led to the accumulation of large and persistent current account deficits.  3 See Cesaroni et al. (2011) for a description of the main properties of the Euro Area business cycle and stylized facts. 
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capita, exchange rates, trade openness, Net Foreign Assets, budget balances, 
GDP growth, population growth, interest rates, oil price, dependency ratios, 
financial development measures and institutional factors).4 However, to the 
best of our knowledge, no paper systematically analyses the CA core and 
periphery effects of financial integration and capital openness in the Eurozone 
countries.  
 
Among the papers linking CA imbalances to financial integration indicators 
in the world economy Chen and Prasad (2003) analyse the medium-run CA 
determinants but focusing mainly on developing countries (18 developed and 
72 developing countries) using cross-section and panel techniques for the 
sample 1971-1995. They find evidence of a positive impact of financial 
deepening (approximated by an M2/GDP measure) on CA for the whole 
sample that is even stronger for the subset of developing countries.  
 
Chinn and Ito (2008) extend the work of Chen and Prasad (2003) and analyse 
the determinants of CA imbalances focusing on the role of financial 
development and institutions. They focus on a set of 19 industrial and 70 
developing countries over the period 1971-2004 but do not control for 
European  countries’  specificities.  To  measure  financial  development  they  use  
the private credit/GDP ratio and they find evidence of a negative and 
significant effect of this indicator on CA for both industrialized and emerging 
groups. In the augmented regressions (considering institutions and financial 
integration effects) they also use the Chinn and Ito (2008) index of financial 
openness to account for financial development and find evidence of a 
negative effect on CA only for industrialized countries. They conclude that                                                         4 Income per capita, exchange rates, trade openness, Net Foreign Assets, budget balances, GDP growth, population growth, interest rates, oil price, and dependency ratios are the standard classical determinants of CA used in the literature. However, some of them have become less significant in explaining the more recent patterns of CA imbalances in both developing and industrialized countries. 
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financial development as a solution for the global saving glut is not supported 
by empirical analysis. As robustness checks, the authors use three alternative 
measures of financial development (first principal components of private 
credit to GDP, stock market capitalization, private and public bond market 
capitalization, and so on), which for the most part confirm the previous 
results. 
 
Among the papers focusing strictly on the Euro Area, Jaumotte and 
Sodsriwiboon (2010) consider a panel of 49 advanced (including 27 EU) and 
emerging   economies   in   1973‒2008.   They   find   that   financial   openness  
(approximated by a financial liberalization index and the Chinn and Ito, 2008 
index) lowers CA in aggregate, but they do not consider the financial 
integration effects separately for core and periphery groups. 
 
Schmitz and von Hagen (2012) distinguish between balances against the 
Eurozone and the rest of the world and examine these flows for the EU-15 
countries, approximating financial deepening with income per capita data. In 
their   main   finding   Eurozone   members’   net   flows   followed   differences   in  
income per capita even before the introduction of the euro. Their econometric 
investigation also reveals a quite substantial financial deepening of the 
European capital markets, whereby divergent capital endowments across the 
EMU countries triggered by financial integration are found to flow from 
countries where capital was abundant to countries where it was scarce.  
 
Belke and Dreger (2013) compare the relative effect of income per capita 
differences and competitiveness on CA using panel co-integration techniques 
for 11 Euro Area countries and different sub-sample periods and conclude 
that diverging competitiveness (approximated with the real exchange rate) 
has been the main factor in external imbalances in the Eurozone. To account 
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for   differences   in   peripheral   countries’   behaviour   they   run   separate  
regressions for Greece, Spain and Portugal and find evidence of a decreasing 
role of income per capita (used as proxy for catching up) for these countries 
over time. They conclude that an asymmetric policy response is required to 
reduce the imbalances (i.e. a depreciation of real exchange rates in the deficit 
countries by cutting unit labour costs) but in the analysis do not consider 
financial integration among the explanatory variables. 
 
Finally, Sanchez and Varoudakis (2013) assess the contribution of some 
macroeconomic factors associated with CA imbalances in the Eurozone by 
estimating a panel-data vector autoregressive model for the period 1975–2011 
without considering the impact of financial integration. In their findings 
demand shocks contributed more to CA balance dynamics in the Eurozone 
periphery than in the core, whereas competitiveness (measured by real 
exchange rates or unit labour costs) was a less prominent factor in the 
periphery but relatively more important  than in the core. 
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, it 
provides a broad empirical analysis of the determinants of intra-Eurozone CA 
balances, including some European financial integration process indicators, 
using static and dynamic panel data techniques.5 To this end we assess the 
relative contribution of the regressors to CA dynamics through an impact 
analysis. Second, it explicitly takes into account the different behaviour of 
core and periphery countries in relation to some selected regressors using 
interaction effects in the regressions. Finally, in order to study the role of 
governance and institutional quality in determining the imbalances within the 
EMU we expand the set of regressors to include qualitative variables.                                                          5 While the static panel approach has been widely used in this context, very few papers concentrate on dynamic panels. 
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reports the main stylized facts 
concerning current account imbalances within the EMU, Section 3 describes 
data sources and sample selection, and Section 4 describes the empirical 
strategy, estimate results and robustness checks. Conclusions follow. 
 
 
2. Stylized facts 
 
There is strong evidence that CA balances have been progressively diverging 
among member countries since the beginning of the 1990s.6 While in a small 
group of countries (mainly Spain, Greece, Portugal, Italy and Ireland) deficits 
became large and persistent, another group of countries (chiefly Germany, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland and Austria) registered large surpluses. 
This finding  reflects  what   in   the  recent   literature  has  been  called  “European  
core-periphery  dualism  of   current   account”.  After   the   recent  Eurozone  debt  
crisis, concerns emerged over the suitability of common fiscal and monetary 
policies   to   reduce   countries’   divergences. The question whether core-
periphery dualism existed before or was actually fostered by the 
intensification of European economic and financial integration process has 
also been a central point in this debate.7 To shed light on the question it is 
important to analyse carefully the determinants of the disequilibria.  
 
In order to analyse these dynamics Figure 1 reports the current account 
balance for the euro area, US and Japan for the period 1991-2012. Looking at 
the overall dynamics we see that while Japan and the US were persistently in 
                                                        6 European Commission (2012). 7 Caporale et al. (2014). 
Current	  account	  “Core-periphery	  dualism”	  in	  the	  EMU 
   8 
surplus and deficit (respectively), the Eurozone experimented a balance close 
to zero with a trend towards a small surplus after the 2008 crisis.  
 
Figure 1. CA balance in industrialized economies 
 
 
To disentangle the dynamics of CA within the Eurozone members, Figure 2 
reports the trends of current account averages for core and peripheral 
countries. The core countries are Germany, Austria, Finland, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and France, while the periphery group is composed of Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece.  
 
Observing the dynamics of intra-area CA balances it is evident that while in 
the pre-euro period there was no substantial divergence on average between 
core and peripheral countries, from 2000, when the EMU was completed, the 
divergences and the dispersion of current account positions in the member 
countries become evident. Although this trend can be considered part of a 
more global phenomenon among the advanced economies due to capital 
liberalization, it was particularly pronounced within the European Union. 
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Figure 2. CA balance in the  EMU core and periphery countries 
 
 
In the period 1985-2008 Germany and a number of other smaller countries of 
Northern Europe (core countries) progressively built up larger current 
account surpluses versus some peripheral countries (Spain, Greece, Portugal 
and Ireland).8 International investors purchased above all financial 
instruments issued by France and Germany that were then used as capital 
inflows within the euro area to finance demand components in deficit 
countries.9 
 
More specifically, the intra-euro-area capital flows financed government debt 
(in Greece), financial sector borrowing such as real estate (in Spain and 
Ireland), or a combination of both (in Portugal and Italy). This pattern of 
capital flows suggests, among other things, that Eurozone investors viewed 
securities issued by peripheral European countries as close substitutes for 
securities issued by the core ones more than investors from outside the euro 
area. 
                                                         8 Portugal’s	  deficit	  remained	  at	  the	  very	  high	  levels	  reached	  early	  in	  the	  decade. See European Commission (2012). 9 Germany was a net supplier for the euro area and a net receiver from outside the euro area. (See European Commission, 2012). 
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Among the periphery and core groups, Italy and Germany displayed 
particular   dynamics.   Germany’s   current   account   surplus   performed   best  
among   the   core   countries,  while   the   deterioration   in   Italy’s   current   account  
was not as severe as for the other peripheral countries. 
 
In order to take these differences into account Figure 3 reports the dynamics 
of  Italy’s  and  Germany’s  CA  together  with  the  CA  averages  of  the  remaining  
core and periphery countries. 
 
Figure 3. CA balance in Italy, Germany and the other core and periphery countries 
 * The core average excludes Germany and the core-periphery excludes Italy. 
 
Looking at Figure 3 we note that although many recent economic analyses 
include Italy among the peripheral countries, its situation is quite singular 
and differs from that of both core and peripheral countries. 
 
Italy's current account balance deteriorated steadily from 1996 to mid-2011. 
From a surplus of 3.2% of GDP in 1996, the CA balance turned slightly 
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negative in 2002-05 and deteriorated significantly after the 2008 financial 
crisis, reaching a deficit of more than 3% of GDP in 2010-11.10  
 
Part of the decline in the current account balance was driven by worsening 
terms of trade as the increasing price of imported oil – on which the Italian 
economy is structurally dependent – negatively affected the goods balance. 
Since the adoption of the euro Italy's net international investment position 
(NIIP) has also deteriorated: it stood at -8.3% of GDP at the end of 1996, but 
declined to about -22.5% by the end of 2012. However, unlike the other 
peripheral countries, the accumulation of current account deficits since 2006 is 
only  partly  explained  by  the  deterioration  in  Italy’s  NIIP.11  
 
Figure 4 reports the average current account of all the core and periphery 
countries for the two sub-periods 1986-98 and 1999-2012. 
 
Figure 4. CA balance (average) in the EMU countries 
 
 
                                                        10 As documented in Cesaroni (2013), whereas during the 1980s output fluctuations in Italy were driven	   mainly	   by	   a	   firm’s	   catching	   up	   process,	   during	   1990s	   demand	   side	   factors	   (i.e.	  currency shocks) became more important. 11 See Lane and Milesi Ferretti databank EWN II (2012). 
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From the graph we see that the average CA balance switched from positive to 
negative for Italy, France and Ireland and from negative to positive for 
Austria and Finland. In 2009-12, there was a substantial adjustment in the 
euro-area   peripheral   countries’   external   imbalances.   On   average   the   CA  
balances of Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal improved and Spain, 
Ireland, Portugal and Italy eventually reached surpluses. The rebalancing of 
trade (and thus of CA balances) in the peripheral countries was mainly due to 
domestic demand declining faster than output. Moreover, the dispersion of 
CA balances in the EMU also remained high in the aftermath of the crisis and 
the rebalancing was mainly caused by a business cycle deterioration rather 
than a catching-up effect. 
 
 
3. Data description and sample selection  
 
We consider two different groups of countries: a full sample containing 22 
emerging and industrialized OECD members 12  and a subsample of 15 EU 
countries, both of which include the 11 main EMU13 economies. Although our 
analysis focuses on the Eurozone, the comparison with the full sample allows 
us to check the robustness results for the subset of EU countries, have a wider 
set of remaining countries of the group to use as control, and to compare our 
findings with those obtained in other empirical studies using a broader set of 
countries.                                                          12 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 13 1999 marks the beginning of the euro period for all countries except Greece, which joined in 2001. Given the small size of their economies compared with the euro area as a whole, the omission of later entrants (namely Slovenia, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta) should not significantly affect the results. A similar choice was made by Caporale and Girardi (2011), among others. 
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To account for core-periphery effects in the estimates we split the EMU 
countries into two different groups: core (Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Finland and France) and periphery (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland 
and Greece) according to the prevailing definition in the literature.14 The data 
come from different sources: OECD, Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2012) and 
World Bank databases (see Tables 1 and 2 in the Appendix for a detailed 
description of the data sources and summary statistics). The time sample 
spans from 1986 to 2012. 1986 is the year in which the Single Act15 was signed 
and 2012 is the latest available year for most of the series in the dataset.  
 
To explain CA determinants we selected a group of regressors on the basis of 
their economic importance and statistical significance. We divide the 
explanatory variables of CA into four groups: i) macroeconomic 
fundamentals;16 ii) time and country dummies; iii) capital openness measures; 
and iv)  governance indicators.  
 
The first group includes: 
 
i)  Real effective exchange rate (REEX).17 This variable takes account of 
price level differences between trading partners. In particular, it considers 
variations in relative prices using consumer prices indices with base 2005.                                                         14 We also performed some sensitivity analysis, but changing the position of Italy from periphery to core does not change the empirical result. 15 A core element of the Single European Act signed in 1986 was to create a Single Market within the European Community by 1992.The most novel aspect of the Single Market Programme (SMP) was its focus on capital mobility. Some EU members had unilaterally liberalized capital mobility prior to the SMP, but substantial pan-European liberalization came only in the second half of the 1980s with a series of single market programme directives. The opening was completed in 1988 by a directive that ruled out all remaining restrictions on capital movements among EU residents. The definitive system was codified in the Maastricht Treaty. 16 We tried also different specifications using more classical regressors such as dependency ratios or interest rates. The fitting was lower than the specification chosen. 17 The role of real exchange rates in determining current account positions is a basic element of the theoretical framework of both traditional and modern approaches to international macroeconomics. For a discussion on the empirical application see Chen et al.	  (2012),	  J.B.	  Gossé	  and F. Serranito (2014), A. Belke  and C. Dreger (2013). 
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Movements in real effective exchange rates provide an indication of the 
evolution   of   a   country’s   aggregate   external   price   competitiveness.18 An 
increase in the index indicates a real effective appreciation and a 
corresponding deterioration in the competitive country position (hence a 
worsening of the CA balance). It is expected to have a negative sign in the 
regression.  
 
ii) Fiscal balance ratio to GDP. The reason for using this is the potential 
effect of the fiscal balance (calculated as tax revenue and the proceeds of 
assets sold, minus any government spending) on the current account (positive 
or negative). Higher levels of public saving across countries historically tend 
to be associated with larger current account surpluses (theory of twin 
deficit19). We do not have any a priori on the sign. 
 
iii) Business cycle. A positive business cycle (measured as output gap) will 
produce a higher income, leading to an increase in consumption expenditure, 
including imported goods and services, and lowering the CA. This variable 
should also catch the impact of the financial crises and it is expected to have a 
negative sign in the regression. 
 
iv) Income per capita. Higher levels of income reflect higher productivity 
due to larger capital endowments. This variable has been used extensively in                                                         18 Percentage changes in the index are calculated by comparing the change in the consumer price index for a given country, converted into US dollars at market exchange rates, to a weighted 
average	   of	   changes	   in	   its	   competitors’	   indices. Chain-linked index takes as base period 2005. Source OECD. 19 See Chinn (2005). This hypothesis underlines the fact that, according to the national accounts, the current account balance (EXP-IMP) is equal to saving (S= Sp+Sg) minus investment. Therefore, any expansion of the fiscal deficit (G-T) that lowers public saving (Sg), the other variables being equal, should cause a worsening of the current account balance. (Sp+SG)-I=(G-T)+(EXP-IMP). In the more sophisticated version of the hypothesis, which takes into account the endogeneity of private saving and investment decisions, fiscal expansion boosts domestic spending, pushing up domestic interest rates relative to foreign rates; this attracts foreign investors and buoys the national currency, thereby widening the current account deficit. 
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the past as a proxy of productivity and competitiveness (Blanchard and 
Giavazzi, 2002). It is expected to have a positive sign in the regression. 
 
v) Real oil price in US dollars. This indicator accounts for the influence of 
the oil price on the current account balance. 
 
The second group includes: 
 
i) Dummies   for  steps   to  deepen  European  economic   integration  such  as  
the   Single   European   Act,   ratification   of   the   Maastricht   Treaty   and   the  
introduction  of  EMU.  We  do  not  have  any  a  priori  on  the  signs. 
 
ii) Dummies   for   different   countries’   subsets   such   as   OECD,   EU,   core-
periphery  groups.  We  do  not  have  any  a  priori  on  the  signs. 
 
The third group includes indicators of financial openness. Financial openness 
indices capture the degree of financial market liberalization and development 
affecting cross-country capital flows. Looking at the financial account as the 
difference between saving and investment and considering the link between 
current account and financial account, the expected sign of financial 
integration on the current account balance will depend on the prevailing 
transmission mechanism to these two components. More specifically, the 
greater is financial development, the higher will be the expected returns on 
investment projects (and the lower the associated risk). The effect of financial 
development on saving is controversial due to possible substitution effects; 
more developed financial markets and a more sophisticated financial system 
would, according to one point of view, lead to greater saving; from another 
point of view they would reduce the need for precautionary saving and could 
decrease the saving rate. Thus, considering net saving, if the magnitude of the 
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financial development effect on saving exceeds that on investment, we will 
have an improvement in the CA; if the effect on investment is greater than the 
effect on saving, we will have a deterioration in the CA. Specifically, we use 
the following two indicators in the analysis: 
 
i) The   Chinn-Ito   index   of   capitals   movement   restrictions   (finopen).20  
Higher  values  of  this  index  indicate  greater  financial  openness  as  the  country  
is  more   open   to   cross-border   capital   transactions.   The   expected   sign   on   the  
current   account  balance  depends  on   the  prevailing   transmission  mechanism  
(Chinn  and  Ito,  2008). 
 
ii) Financial  openness   index   (finopen1).  The   index   is  given  by   the  sum  of  
financial   assets   plus   liabilities   divided   by   GDP   and   it   represents   a   de   facto  
measure  of  financial  diffusion  in  a  given  country.  We  do  not  have  an  a  priori  
on  the  CA  balance  effect  of  this  indicator  as  the  expected  sign  depends  on  the  
prevailing   transmission  mechanism  described  above   (see  Figures   5   and  6  of  
the  Appendix). 
 
The fourth group includes governance indicators taken from two different 
sources: the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database (see 
Kaufmann et al., 2010) and the Economic Freedom of the World database 
produced by the Fraser Institute.21 These indicators, coming from opinion 
surveys, are qualitative and are used as control variables for a check of 
robustness results. The indicators used are Voice and Accountability,                                                         20 The index is the first principal component of the binary variables pertaining to cross-border financial transactions	  based	  on	  the	  IMF’s	  categorical	  enumeration	  taken	  from	  the	  Annual	  Report	  on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). 21The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) are a research dataset summarizing views on the quality of governance of a large number of enterprises, citizens and expert respondents in industrial and developing countries. The data are gathered from several survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms. The Fraser Institute measures and studies the impact of competitive markets and government interventions on individuals and society. See Economic Freedom of the World, 2013. 
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Corruption Reduction, Government Effectiveness, Capital Market Regulation, 
Capital Control and Regulatory Quality. All the indicators, with the exception 
of corruption, capital controls and credit market regulations (available from 
2000 on an annual basis) are only available starting from 2002. We expect all 
these indicators to have a positive impact on the CA balance as they all proxy 
“institutional  quality”.  The  improvement  in  institutional  quality  is  a  drag on 
moral hazard and adverse selection and leads to more effective capital 
allocation in the international financial market (see Table A1 of the Appendix 
for a full description). 
 
 
4. Econometric Analysis  
 
In this section we empirically investigate to what extent European financial 
integration and other EU specific effects (i.e. the creation of EMU) accounted 
for CA divergences among the Eurozone members using both static and 
dynamic panel econometric models. Static panel regressions allow comparing 
the results with previous studies based on pooled regressions as we have 
cross-country time series data. Dynamic panel techniques are used in the full 
sample analysis (Table 5) only as robustness check because trade flows, and 
thus the CA, are affected by marked persistence effects due to the existence of 
sunk costs in entering foreign markets.22  In the other tables we focus on static 
                                                        22 Considering dynamics into panels raises econometric problems. If trade were a static process, the fixed-effect estimator would be consistent for a finite time dimension T and an infinite number of countries N. Since we consider CA evolution as dynamic process, the transformation needed to eliminate the fixed effects produces a correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the transformed error term that renders the least square estimator biased and not consistent. To avoid the inconsistency problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggested transforming the model into first differences and running it with the Hansen two-step GMM estimator. Arellano and Bover (1995) described how additional moment conditions could increase efficiency if the original equations in levels were added to the system of first-differenced 
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panels are assumed to be our benchmark and allow comparison of the results 
with other studies based on CA. 
 
Static panel data approach  
 
 We estimate the following equation: 
 
CA୧୲ = β୧ + βଵ ∗ REEX୧୲ିଵ + βଶ ∗ bcy୧୲ + βଷ ∗ I(k)finopen୧୲ + βସ ∗ I(k)fisbal୧୲ + βହ ∗ Z୧୲[1] 
 
where the dependent variable CAit is the CA balance to GDP ratio in nominal 
US$ determined by the difference between Exports and Imports plus Net 
Income and unilateral transfers.23 The country and year indices are 
respectively i and t and β୧ collects the fixed country effects. REEX is the real 
effective exchange rate of the currency included with a time lag to avoid 
possible endogeneity; bcy it is a proxy of the business cycle (output gap); 
fisbalit is the public budget balance divided by GDP; and finopenit is the 
financial openness indicator (i.e. a de facto capital openness indicator and the 
Chinn-Ito index). Zit contains common factors affecting the CA and includes 
indicators of real oil prices, income per capita, internal distance, geographical 
area and governance.24 Finally, I(k) is a binary indicator accounting for 
interaction effects among groups of countries that takes the value one (and 
zero otherwise) for (a) countries belonging to core (k = 1), (b) countries 
belonging to periphery (k = 2), and (c) countries belonging to the OECD but                                                                                                                                                               
equations.	  This	  estimator,	   the	  “System	  GMM”	  estimator,	  has	  been	  refined	  by	  Blundell	  and	  Bond	  (1998). 23 We decided to take as dependent variable the overall CA balance and not the intra-area CA balance because the evidence showed a strict correspondence between the CA deficit and surplus within the area that could potentially lead to some statistical misspecification once the regression was run for the EU sample. 24 The internal distance of a country (taken from the Cepii database) is approximated by the area of the country or its square root multiplied by a suitably defined proportionality factor. The area is the geographical area of the country in km2. We decide to introduce these two variables in the estimate as proxies of market potential to control for the dimension of the national markets in line with the relevant literature. See for example Melitz (2005). 
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not to the core or periphery (k = 3). This interaction is considered for both 
capital openness and budget balance data. Regarding the decision to split the 
budget balance effects as well as the capital openness effects on the CA, it is 
important to stress that while the impact of the fiscal stance is not our main 
focus, it might be relevant to explore the link between the sign and magnitude 
of budget balance and capital openness coefficients in the regressions.  
 
Dynamic panel data approach 
 
The estimated panel dynamic equation takes the following form: 
 
CA୧୲ = β୧ + β଴CA୧୲ିଵ + βଵ ∗ REEX୧୲ିଵ + βଶ ∗ bcy୧୲ + βଷ ∗ I(k)finopen୧୲ + βସ ∗ I(k)fisbal୧୲ 
+βହ ∗ Z୧୲           [2] 
 
Although the System GMM provides many advantages, we should also 
consider some caveats. First of all, the approach is complicated to implement 
and can easily generate invalid estimates. To cope with the complexity, the 
key is to obtain proper instruments, to guarantee the overall validity of the 
moment conditions, and to control for serial correlation in the error term of 
the equation in levels. In the analysis we employ the Hansen test to check for 
the overall validity of the selected moment conditions and we use the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) test to check for possible serial correlation in the 
level equation. In addition, there is a specific issue associated with our 
exercise when using the System GMM. The long time dimension of our 
dataset (1986–2012) may cause too many instruments25, which potentially 
makes the two-step System GMM not appropriate for inference. To deal with 
this issue, in what follows we use the one step System GMM, although 
theoretically less efficient than the two-step counterpart. However, according                                                         25 In the regressions we selected  from  1 to 2 instruments depending on the regressions. 
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to Bun and Windmeijer (2010), the difference between both is only marginal. 
In the GMM we used the lagged variables of the corresponding endogenous 
variables as instruments. 
 
 
4.1 Robustness with respect to panel techniques  
 
Table 5 reports the estimate results of static fixed effects and dynamic panel 
regression models for the OECD and the EU country groups in the full sample 
1986-2012. To evaluate the possible impact of time invariant factors such as 
area and internal distance, we also compare the Fixed Effects results with the 
Hausman and Taylor (HT) estimator.  
 
To determine the static econometric strategy (i.e. Random Effects versus Fixed 
Effects) we performed a Hausman specification test to check the presence of 
correlation between explanatory variables and individual effects. Results 
show that the null hypothesis of zero correlation is refused, indicating that for 
our purposes the Fixed Effects model provides more efficient estimates than 
the Random Effects one.26  
 
In addition to the main macroeconomic determinants an EMU dummy27 
taking into account the effect of the EMU countries joining the common 
currency on the CA is also included in the estimates. For the OECD group, we 
checked for possible different effects of financial integration and fiscal stance                                                         26 The two most widely used panel data models are the random effect model (REM) and the fixed effect model (FEM): both can control for heterogeneity. Their assumptions are different. REM models require unobserved bilateral effects to be ~ n.i.i. and orthogonal to the remaining part of the error term. Regressors have to be uncorrelated to individual effects and error term for all cross-sections and time periods. If the orthogonality conditions hold, the REM provides more efficient estimates than FE estimators. If explanatory variables are correlated with unobserved individual effects FEM is consistent. 27 This dummy considers the different entry dates of the various countries in the EMU. 
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in  the  “core  and  periphery”  Eurozone  countries  by  including  in  the  estimates  
three complementary interaction terms for the financial integration indicator 
(finopen*core, finopen*periphery and finopen*OECD_EZ) and three for the 
fiscal balance (fiscalbal*core and fiscalbal*periphery and 
fiscalbal*OECD_EZ28), all built by multiplying the core, periphery and 
OECD_EZ dummies for the above indicators. Core, periphery and OECD_EZ 
dummies take into account the effect of financial openness and fiscal balance 
on the CA respectively for the core, periphery and OECD countries excluding 
the Eurozone. Finopen is the Chinn ITO (2008) index taken in levels. For the 
EU subgroup (14 countries) the interaction effects terms obviously refer only 
to Core and Periphery. 
 
OECD countries. The estimate results for 22 OECD countries obtained with the 
fixed effects model (column 1) show that the REEX, output gap, income per 
capita and oil price are significant and enter with the expected signs.29 The 
EMU dummy is also significant and contributes to lower the CA in the period 
considered. 
 
Looking at the interaction terms, the most interesting finding is that the 
financial openness indicator seems to have had a positive impact on the CA 
imbalance for the OECD countries excluding the Eurozone on average (2.39), 
whereas disentangling the impact for EMU core and periphery countries it 
emerges that financial integration had a negative impact on the periphery (-
1.22) but for the core countries the coefficient is positive though not 
statistically significant. Our evidence of a positive impact of financial                                                         28Following the literature (Caporale and Girardi, 2011; Caporale et al., 2014) we define Austria, 
Belgium,	   Finland,	   France,	   Germany	   and	   the	   Netherlands	   as	   “core”	   and	   Greece,	   Ireland,	   Italy,	  Portugal and Spain as peripheral EMU countries. 29 In this form it is not possible to make a cross comparison of the magnitude of the coefficients that are not elasticities as the regressors are not in logarithmic form. This is due to the fact that many indicators take negative values and sp cannot be transformed into logarithms. 
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openness (measured with the Chinn and Ito index) for the OECD group 
excluding the Eurozone is not fully comparable with the results of Chinn and 
Ito (2008). They find a negative and significant relationship with the CA for 
developed countries and a positive relation for less developed and emerging 
economies. When comparing the results we have to consider that our 
subsample associated with the interaction term OECD_nonEZ is very small 
(11 countries) and is a mix that includes both industrialized economies such 
as the US, Canada, Japan, the UK and Switzerland and emerging countries 
such as Korea and Mexico.  
 
Another interesting result concerns the relation between the CA and the fiscal 
balance for the three interaction terms. According to our estimates the fiscal 
balance has a positive and significant sign for the Eurozone core countries 
(0.26) and for the OECD group excluding the Eurozone (0.21), confirming the 
twin deficit hypothesis for these groups of countries, in line with the findings 
of Chinn and Ito (2008).30 Interestingly, the panel estimates show no 
significant relation between the government and the external balance for the 
peripheral countries. Since according to some observers the relations between 
public deficit and  CA are at the heart of the crisis affecting these countries, to 
further investigate this apparently counter-intuitive result for the periphery, 
we considered additional regressions in which we included budget balance as 
only regressor, as aggregate and again interacted with the three dummy 
groups.  
 
In this case we find that the budget balance is positive and significant as 
aggregate, but regressing the budget balance on the CA considering 
interaction terms, we find even in this case a negative and not statistically                                                         30 We also tested the cyclically adjusted budget balance indicators and the results were substantially unchanged. 
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significant coefficient in the periphery. As a further check we also considered 
specifications including the cyclically adjusted budget balance and the results 
of a not significant effect for the periphery group were confirmed. 
 
A possible explanation for insignificance of debt could rely on the fact that the 
estimation outcome is the average of very different individual country deficit 
dynamics and structural changes determined by sovereign debt crisis in some 
of them could somehow have had an influence. Another possible explanation 
concerns the view according to which CA deficits in the periphery were 
mainly financed by private debt (i.e. private sector expenditures in the 
periphery financed by the banking sector) rather than public deficits. This 
evidence can be found in for example in Constancio (2013) and will be object 
of further research. 
 
Comparing the results with respect to other panel techniques we find that for 
the HT estimator (column 2) the previous findings are confirmed, whereas the 
variables internal area and distance, introduced to account for possible 
geographical country (time invariant) effects, are not statistically significant. 
The estimation results from the dynamic panel model are reported in column 
3. For income per capita and oil price the sign and the size of the estimated 
coefficients are similar to those obtained with the FE model. For business 
cycle and REEX the magnitude of the coefficients slightly decreases to -0.21 
and -0.04 respectively. The effects on the CA coming from core and periphery 
groups concerning the interaction terms both for fiscal balance and financial 
openness are also confirmed, showing similarity and robustness with respect 
to the static panel estimates. 
 
European Union countries. The fixed effects estimates for the EU sample 
(column 4) show robust and similar results with respect to the OECD sample 
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although with a different magnitude of the impact coefficients. Specifically, 
the output gap coefficient is significant (-0.28) and seems to indicate that the 
business cycle contributed to explain CA trends even with a lower impact 
with respect to the OECD sample (-0.36). By contrast, the real effective 
exchange rate (-0.16) seems to have had a greater role in explaining CA 
dynamics within the subset of EU countries. The financial openness 
coefficient for the core countries is positive but not statistically significant, 
whereas for the periphery it is negative and significant. Looking at the 
interaction terms for budget balance we find a positive and significant 
coefficient for the core countries (0.23). On the contrary the panel estimates 
show no significant relation between the government and the external balance 
for the peripheral countries (in this case the coefficient is negative but 
insignificant). 
 
Table 5. CA determinants in OECD and EU countries. Full sample 1986-2012.  OECD EU  F-E H-T GMM-SYS  F-E H-T GMM-SYS  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Cait -1  
 
 0.72***   0.87*** constant 6.90*** 11.40** 0.97 -13.82 *** 19.25** -0.023 ***  fisbali*OECD_EZ 0.21*** 0.22 ***     fisbal*core 0.26** 0.26*** 0.09 0.23** 0.23** 0.04 fisbal*periphery 0.07 0.07 -0.11** 0.01 0.03 -0.15*** bcycle.it -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.21*** -0.28*** -0.28 *** -0.13*** REEXit-1 -0.12 *** -0.12*** -0.04*** -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.02 finopeni*OECD_EZ 2.39***  2.24*** 0.27    finopen*core 0.16 0.27 0.08 -0.23 0.04 -0.12  finopeni*periphery -1.22*** -1.23*** -0.60*** -1.03 *** -1.12*** -0.40** EMU -1.36 *** -1.38 *** -0.40 -1.93 *** -1.97*** -0.33 Oil price -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03 *** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
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 income per capita 0.34*** 0.30 *** 0.27 *** 0.35*** 0.32 *** 0.20 *** distance  -0.02 0.00  -0.1 -0.1 area    0.00 0.00  0.00 000 Number of countries 21 21 21 14 14 14 Observations 513 513 513 317 317 317 
𝑅ଶ 0.27   0.45    Sargan over-identifying restriction test   254.27 (0.000)    212.05 (0.000) Test for interaction terms  1.09 33.20*** 1.03 32.3*** 0.37 6.43** 3.11* 19.43*** 4.8** 8.3** 2.73* Over-identification test  (S-   4.04 (0.85)  7.66 9.44* (0.26)  *** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. P-value in parenthesis 
 
Overall, financial openness seems to have had a negative and significant 
impact only on the peripheral countries (financial openness for the core 
countries is not significant) both in the OECD and EU subsets. In the OECD 
group the EMU dummy coefficient, in line with the findings of Schmitz and 
von Hagen (2012), is negative and significant indicating a negative effect of 
the EMU. The results also hold for the EU group. The negative sign of the 
EMU dummy therefore seems to be consistent with the negative impact of 
financial integration for peripheral countries in both the OECD and EU 
samples and suggests, similarly to Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010), a role 
of capital flows in determining CA imbalances in the periphery. The 
disentangled impact of the fiscal balance for core and peripheral countries on 
the CA shows in this case too that the twin deficit hypothesis is confirmed 
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only for the core countries, while for the peripheral countries the regressor is 
negative but not statistically significant.31 
 
 
4.2 Robustness with respect to panel techniques  
 
In order to check the robustness of the results of EU countries in the full 
sample (1986-2012), in Table 6 we replicate the same fixed effects regression 
procedure in a shorter sample (1999-2012) corresponding to the post-EMU 
period. As a further check, given the peculiar behaviour of CA balance 
dynamics in Germany and Italy with respect to other core and peripheral 
countries, we also consider an EU subset sample that excludes Italy and 
Germany from the estimates (column 3). It is worth noting that when 
considering the post-EMU period the capital account openness measures can 
lose significance in interpretation depending on the way in which they are 
constructed. For example, the financial openness index of Chinn and Ito 
appears to have lower variability in this shorter sample because since the 
creation of the EMU the index has been nearly constant at the level of highest 
capital openness within the Eurozone countries. To deal with this 
shortcoming, in the following set of regressions we use a De_Facto financial 
integration indicator (finopen1) built as the sum of net assets and net 
liabilities divided by GDP in place of the Chinn and Ito index. As for REEX, 
the indicator is included with a lag in the estimates in order to avoid possible 
endogeneity (here due to the fact that the numerator of the ratio comes from 
the balance of payments financial account component). As we show in this                                                         31 Belke and Dreger (2013) a find a negative coefficient of fiscal deficit in three periphery countries in a similar time sample, although their fiscal indicator is the level of government debt and not the deficit.  
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paragraph, the use of this second financial integration indicator does not 
weaken the previous findings because it performs very well also in the full 
sample (i.e. from 1986), providing similar results and conclusions.  
 
Table 6. CA determinants in OECD and EU countries. FE model. Sample 1999-2012 
 OECD EU EU ex Italy and Germany constant         -0.33 -0.82 -0.83 fisbali*OECD_EZ 0.23***   fisbal*core 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.91***  fisbal*periphery 0.01 0.02 0.03 bcycle.it -0.50*** -0.53*** -0.56*** REEXit-1 -0.06** -0.06 -0.04 finopen1OECD_EZ1i 
 
-0.04   finopen1*core 
 
0.3* 0.33* 0.30 finopen1*periphery 
 
-0.27** -0.27** -0.28** EMU -1.76    income per capita 0.49***  0.45*** 0.39*** Oil price -0.04***  -0.04*** -0.04*** Number of countries 21 14 12 Observations 273 168 156 
𝑅ଶ 0.48 0.49 0.45   5.58 27.01*** 104.9*** Wald test for interaction terms (F  14.91*** 0.95 28.00*** 13.78*** 25.48*** 13.51*** *** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Looking at Table 6 all the previous results are confirmed especially for what 
concerns the impact of financial integration on core and peripheral Eurozone 
countries. The sensitivity analysis in column 3 also shows that the exclusion of 
Current	  account	  “Core-periphery	  dualism”	  in	  the	  EMU 
   28 
Germany and Italy from the sample keeps the empirical results substantially 
unchanged.  
 
Table 7. CA determinants in the EU countries over time. Fixed effects model  Full sample Economic  integration 
sample 
Post-EMU 
sample  (1986-2012) (1993-2012) (1999-2012) Constant         14.34*** 9.09** -0.82     fisbalit *core 0.20** 0.3** 0.89***  fisbalit *periphery -0.15** -0.08 0.02  bcy.it -0.30** -0.41*** -0.53***  REEXit-1 -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.06  finopen1*core 0.07 0.02 0.33*  finopen1*periphery -0.13** -0.16** -0.27**  income per capita 0.21*** 0.30*** 0.45***  Oil price -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.04*** Number of countries 14 14 14 Observations 317 272 196 
𝑅ଶ 0.31 0.44 0.49  50.08*** 33.49*** 104.9*** Wald test for interaction terms (F  6.58* 6.14* 5.87** 5.70** 25.48*** 13.51*** *** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. *With respect to Table A1 
we	  dropped	  the	  EMU	  dummy	  to	  compare	  the	  coefficients’	  magnitude	  over	  time. 
 
To check the reliability and the stability of our findings for the EU subset after 
the introduction of EMU in what follows we concentrate on the group of EU 
countries and we assess the estimate results with respect to different time 
samples. These also allow us to make some considerations on the role played 
by the European integration process in determining CA disequilibria. To this 
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end, Table 7 compares the coefficients of the regressions over three samples 
corresponding to various European integration deepening steps: i) the full 
sample 1986-2012 with 1986 corresponding to the ratification of the European 
Single Act; ii) the economic integration sample 1993-2012 with 1993 as starting 
date, being the year of both the completion of the Single Market Programme 
and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty; and iii) the post-EMU sample 
1999-2012.  
 
Looking  at   the  changes   in  the  coefficients’  magnitude  over  the  three  periods  
there are some interesting findings: i) the REEX coefficient decreases 
substantially in the post-euro period32 showing, similarly to Sanchez and 
Varoudakis (2013), a minor role for competitiveness in explaining CA trends 
in the last decade; ii) the business cycle has a greater role in explaining the CA 
balance in the post-euro period than in the other two previous samples; and 
iii) the magnitude of the financial openness coefficient for the periphery 
countries almost doubled in the post-euro period in line with the stylized 
facts (paragraph 2, Figure 2). Interestingly, the financial deepening indicator 
coefficient for the core countries is positive and significant starting from 1999. 
This result corroborates the view of Schmitz and von Hagen (2012) that the 
dispersion of CA balances in the Eurozone widened after the introduction of 
the euro and thus that somehow during the process of financial integration it 
partly failed to fulfil the predictions of the OCA theories.33 Income per capita, 
which in the literature is used as a proxy of convergence and catching up, is 
positive and statistically significant and its magnitude increases over time. 
This finding could suggest a convergence between the EU groups. However, 
as a robustness check we redid the same regressions disentangling the overall 
effect of income per capita for core and periphery using interaction dummies                                                         32The REEX is not statistically significant in the post-EMU period at aggregate level while it is statistically significant for the periphery group. 33 These results are also in line with Caporale et al. (2014). 
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(as we had done for financial openness and budget balance). The results, 
which we do not report for reasons of brevity, suggest a completely opposite 
interpretation: in this case income per capita is in fact positive and significant 
only for the core, whereas for the periphery group the coefficient is negative. 
This result is in line with the findings of Belke and Draeger (2013). 
 
In order to give an idea of the absolute magnitude of the impact of the 
coefficients on the CA, in Table 8 the average elasticity of the estimated 
coefficients over the 3 periods is reported.34  
 
Table 8. CA elasticity to main explanatory variables in the EU countries* 
  Full sample Economic integration sample Post-EMU sample 
  (1986-2012) (1993-2012) (1999-2012) bcy.it  -0.04 -0.05 -0.72 REEXt-1  -25.3 -17.0 -13.8 fisbalit *core 0.4 0.4 1.2 
fisbalit *periphery -0.4 0.2 -0.1 
finopeni1*core 0.3 0.1 1.8 finopeni1*periphery -0.3 -0.4 -1.5 *The grey area indicates that the elasticity is referred to not statistically significant coefficients. 
 
Looking at the results we note that the business cycle elasticity significantly 
increases in the EMU period from -0.05 to -0.72. By contrast, the elasticity of 
the real effective exchange rate seems to decrease over the subsamples 
analysed, suggesting a decreasing role for price competitiveness. The                                                         34 Elasticity is the percentage variation of the CA as a ratio to GDP due to a unitary percentage variation in the explicative variables included in the estimates. The elasticity reported in the table is given by the estimated coefficient times the average regressor value for the period under examination, divided by the average value of the dependent variable.  
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elasticity of the fiscal balance for the core countries increases in the post-EMU 
sample. Interestingly, the average elasticity of the financial openness 
coefficient for the peripheral countries shows a progressive increase from 
about -0.4% before the EMU to -1.5% in the post-EMU period for the 
peripheral countries. For the core countries the elasticity of financial openness 
in the post-EMU period is about 1.8%. These results support our hypothesis of 
a role played by European integration process in determining the core-
periphery dualism in the EMU. The absence of an endogenously determined 
process of current account and business cycle convergence within the 
Eurozone, as seems to emerge in the empirical analysis, suggests that to 
guarantee financial stability within the Eurozone more coordinated policies 
and a stricter European surveillance procedure might be needed.35 
 
Impact analysis. To further analyse the impact of financial openness on the CA 
in what   follows  we  assess   the   contribution  of   core   and  periphery   countries’  
explanatory variables to the model prediction. More specifically, we evaluate 
the contribution of the various regressors to overall CA variation between 
1999 and 2007 (2008 is the year of the crisis). The sum of the contribution is 
equal  to  the  model’s  predicted  value.  We  also  report  the  actual  and  predicted  
values of CA growth rates over the period for each country. To perform the 
impact exercise we consider the regression coefficients reported in column 3 
(post-EMU sample) of Table 7.  
 
 
 
                                                         35 It should be underlined, however, that in the aftermath of the crisis some reforms have already been implemented. For example, a new surveillance and enforcement mechanism was set up in December 2011 as part of the so-called	   “Six-Pack”	   legislation,	   which	   reinforced	   economic	  governance in the EU and the euro area.  
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Table 9.	  CA	  imbalances	  and	  “governance”	  in	  the	  EU	  countries.	  Sample	  2000-2012 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3* Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Constant -14.86** -9.33** -3.55 -5.46* -4.81 -0.05 -2.11  fiscalbalit *core 0.71*** 0.95*** 1.1*** 0.74*** 1.00*** 0.93*** 0.73***  fiscalbalit *periphery -0.14* -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 -0.11*  REEXit-1 0.07* 0.01 -0.10** -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.08**  bcycle.it -0.46*** -0.49*** -0.43*** -0.42*** -0.60*** -0.47*** -0.44***  finopeni1*core 0.17 0.14 0.40** 0.42* 0.02 0.12 0.36  finopeni1*periphery -0.46*** 0.31** -0.29*** -0.28*** -0.32** -0.25** -0.27**  Income per capita 0.46*** 0.24** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.21** 0.28** 0.49***  Oil price -0.03** -0.02 -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03** -0.03* -0.04***  Corruption  1.72***       gov. effectiveness**  3.52**       capital mkt reg   0.40     capital control    0.32    voice and accountability**     4.71**   reg. quality indicators**      -1.35  priv. sect credit       0.23* Number of countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 Observations 168 154 168 168 131 154 168 
𝑅ଶ overall 0.61 0.49 0.54 0.52 0.42 0.22 0.56  Wald test for interaction (a) 32.94*** 10.85*** 38.5*** 3.96* 27.06*** 11.22*** 27.74*** 13.00*** 48.25*** 5.05** 32.4*** 2.64 38.17** 11.85*** **Voice and accountability, government effectiveness and regulatory quality indicators are only available from 2002, Portugal is not included in the governance indicators. *** significant at 1% , ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. (a) The first row refers to financial openness, the second one  to fiscal balance. 
 
 
The main contribution of financial openness to reducing the CA among the 
peripheral countries is in Ireland, a result that highlights the Irish financial 
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system’s  heavy  exposure  even  before  the  2007  housing  bubble  burst  (the  large  
capital flows in this country are also linked to the advantageous fiscal system 
that attracts foreign direct investment). Competitiveness contributes to lower 
the CA in all the countries except Germany. As expected, the business cycle 
contributes to the deterioration in the CA in almost countries (except 
Portugal). The oil price also plays, as expected, an important contribution in 
lowering the CA for all countries. Income per capita makes an important 
contribution in explaining the CA in all countries, although, as explained 
when describing the estimation results of Table 7, the coefficient comes from 
an average of core and periphery effects. Disentangling the effect for core and 
periphery (by introducing the interaction term in the estimates), we would 
find an opposite contribution of income per capita to the CA in the periphery. 
 
 
4.3 Robustness to control variables: the role of institutions  
 
The dispersion of the CA balances in various Eurozone members, especially 
after 1999, reported in the literature has also been considered in relation to 
qualitative indicators approximating governance and policy coordination 
(Giavazzi and Spaventa 2010; Eichengreen 2010). To make some further 
robustness checks, in Table 7 we include some governance indicators in the 
previous estimates. Although the governance concept is widely discussed 
among policy makers and difficult to quantify in empirical analyses, 
especially if the aim is to assess the effects of European governance, we try to 
approximate it through institutional quality indicators at country level. In 
interpreting the latter analysis, however, we need to take into account all the 
caveats due to the use of signals coming from qualitative survey indicators. 
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As these indicators are only available without discontinuities starting from 
1999, the estimation sample is 1999-2012. 
 
The estimation results reported in Table 9 column 1 show that the corruption 
indicator which accounts, by construction, for an increased reduction of 
corruption, is statistically significant and indicates, as expected and in line 
with Eichengreen (2010), that the decrease in corruption improves the CA 
balance within the EU countries. The results (Table 9 column 2) also show that 
the effectiveness of governance (which reflects perceptions of the quality of 
public and civil services and the degree of governance independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies) is 
statistically significant and contributed to the improvement in the CA balance 
during the EMU. The voice and accountability indicator is also statistically 
significant during the EMU and enters with the expected positive sign.  
 
By contrast, capital control (limits on financial flows), regulatory quality and 
credit market regulation are not statistically significant in the period 
considered. This could be due to the fact that the phenomenon is captured by 
the quantitative financial openness indicator included in the estimates. 
Overall, the governance indicators seem to have played a role in explaining 
CA dynamics. 
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5. Conclusion  
 
In this paper we analysed the role of financial integration in determining the 
dispersion in CA balances within Eurozone members. More specifically, we 
quantified this impact through the introduction of two financial integration 
indicators in the estimates, namely the Chinn and Ito (2008) index and a de 
facto measure of capital openness. According to our estimates, and mostly in 
line with the prevailing theoretical and empirical literature, financial 
integration seems to have played a role in explaining CA dynamics in both 
the main OECD and the EU countries. In particular, looking at the Eurozone 
and differentiating the impact of financial integration for core and peripheral 
countries, we find evidence of a negative impact of financial integration in the 
Eurozone periphery. Moreover, this negative relationship seems to have 
increased in the post-euro period. The business cycle has also had a growing 
role over time, whereas competiveness appears to have reduced its impact on 
CA balances over time.  
 
The increase in foreign capital inflows in the peripheral countries indicates 
that the EMU was effective in integrating the European capital market. 
However, the home bias reduction in the financial market contributed, 
according   to   our   estimates,   in   creating   a   “CA   core-periphery   dualism”,  
especially in the post-EMU period.  
 
This finding suggests that the recent reforms of European governance 
designed to create stricter European surveillance procedures, by reducing 
asymmetric CA imbalances in the Eurozone, could also improve the 
effectiveness of centralized policies. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Data description  
Current account Sum of net exports of goods, services, net income and net current transfers as a percentage of GDP. All in nominal terms (US $). Source: OECD (1986-2012) 
Output gap 
 
% deviation of GDP from its trend. Source: OECD 
Fiscal balance/GDP Tax revenue minus any government spending. Source: WDI World Bank 
Income per capita 
 
Income per capita in US dollars. Source: OECD 
Real effective 
exchange rate 
Percentage changes in the index are calculated by comparing the change in the consumer price index for a given country converted into US dollars at market exchange rates to a 
weighted	   average	   of	   changes	   in	   its	   competitors’	   indices,	  Chain-linked index takes as base period 2005.  
Source: OECD 
Real oil price in US$ Price of oil in US dollars. Source: Thomson Reuters 
Corruption  Is the abuse of public power for private gain. Source:Fraser Institute 
Capital controls Restrictions	  on	  the	  citizens’	  ability	   to	  own	  foreign	  currency,	  bank accounts domestically and overseas. Source:Fraser Institute 
Regulatory quality Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.  
 
Source:WGI World Bank 
Voice and 
accountability 
Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  
 
Source:WGI World Bank 
Government 
effectiveness 
Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.   
 
Source:WGI World Bank 
Private sector credit Measures the extent to which government borrowing displaces private borrowing.  Source:Fraser Institute 
Credit market 
regulation 
 
Measures the restriction under which banks operate. Source:Fraser Institute 
Chinn-Ito index Capital openness measure. Source: Chinn-Ito (2008) 
Finopen 1 Net foreign assets+ liabilities (NFA+NFL)/GDP. Source:EWNII Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2012) 
Internal distance The internal distance taken of a country is approximated by Source: Cepii 
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the area of the country or its square root, multiplied by a suitably defined proportionality factor.  
Area The area is the geographical area of the country in Km2. Source: Cepii 
 
 
 
Table A2. Summary statistics. Sample 1986-2012 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max             cagdp 579 1.066625 5.528006 -15.3773 25.10396 bcycl 567 0.035219 2.799673 -12.6077 10.73026 reex 594 99.81061 12.17988 63.7 146.2 finopen 562 1.81517 1.022902 -1.86397 2.439009 oil price 594 67.15765 45.84463 24.8901 168.745 finopen1 572 3.656724 4.642344 0.25269 37.56802 incomepc 594 21.58691 8.874802 4.467985 58.25797 fiscalbal 542 -2.21286 4.746157 -30.62 18.79 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3. Chinn Ito index of capital openness in the EMU countries. Period 1986-
2012. 
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Figure A4. De facto capital openness index in the EMU countries. Period 1986-
2012. 
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